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raises issues of respect for the intellectual freedom of your students. The 
central thesis of this article is that these issues are best addressed on the basis 
of general principles of academic freedom-that is, intellectual freedom in 
educational and research contexts. Three cases are analyzed on the basis of 
principles developed by the Academic Freedom Coalition of Nebraska 
(AFCON). These principles permit advocacy, rather than requiring neutral- 
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Addressing homophobia and heterosexism as a teacher immediately raises 
issues of respect for the intellectual freedom of your students. How free should 
you be to raise issues of sexual orientation in your classes? How free should you 
be to express and argue for your own views on these issues? How free should 
students be to express views that you deem homophobic or heterosexist? 
The central thesis of this article is that issues of this sort are best addressed 
on the basis of principles of academic freedom. By academic freedom, I mean 
intellectual freedom in educational and research contexts, the definition used 
by the Academic Freedom Coalition of Nebraska (AFCON) since its founding 
in 1988. Thus academic freedom fully encompasses students and faculty at all 
levels of education. Some aspects of academic freedom may be legally pro- 
tected in some contexts, but academic freedom is not a set of legal rights. 
Rather, it is a social context of liberty justified by the role of intellectual free- 
dom in education and by the various moral and professional rights and respon- 
sibilities associated with this. 
On the basis of this conception AFCON has developed a set of Principles of 
Academic Freedom (see appendix a) and a subsequent Statement applying 
these principles to matters of sexuality. In the next section I briefly describe the 
history leading to the adoption of these documents. The rest of the article illus- 
trates the application of academic freedom principles to three cases. 
PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
AFCON was founded in 1988 as a coalition of Nebraska organizations con- 
cerned with intellectual freedom in the educational institutions of Nebraska. 
Current members of the coalition include the Nebraska State Education Asso- 
ciation, the Lincoln Education Association, the Nebraska Educational Media 
Association, the Lincoln Public School Media, the Nebsaska EnglishILan- 
guage Arts Council, the Nebraska High School Press Association, the Ne- 
braska State Reading Association, the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) 
Academic Senate, the UNL Chapter of the American Association of Univer- 
sity Professors, the Nebraska Chapter of the National Association of Scholars, 
ACLU Nebraska, the Nebraska Library Association, the Nebraska Press Asso- 
ciation, the Nebraska Center for the Book, Journal Writers of Nebraska, the 
Story Monkey, and the Nebraska Writers Guild. Members of the coalition se- 
lect representatives to serve on the AFCON Board of Directors. 
Since its beginning AFCON has construed academic freedom as intellec- 
tual freedom in educational and research contexts. Such freedom can some- 
times be protected in U.S. public education by invoking the First Amendment 
rights of individual students or faculty (Kors & Silverglate, 1999; O'Neil, 
1997). AFCON has consistently maintained, however, along with the American 
Association of University Professors (1940/2001), that academic freedom is 
fundamentally a condition for education and research, not just a set of legal 
rights. That is, adherence to principles of academic freedom fosters excellence 
in education and research while simultaneously respecting the autonomy of indi- 
vidual students and faculty. This emphasis on the intellectual and moral, as op- 
posed to legal, basis for academic freedom has become increasingly important 
since Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), in which the U.S. Supreme Court greatly 
restricted the application of the First Amendment in curricular contexts. 
Throughout its history, many of the cases coming to AFCON's attention 
have involved issues of sexual orientation. Given that this experience was fully 
consistent with national trends and showed no sign of abating, the AFCON 
Board decided in 1998 to develop a policy statement concerning issues of aca- 
demic freedom related to sexual orientation. Although drafts of such a policy 
received positive feedback from a variety of sources, an unexpected problem 
arose. Some people thought it odd that AFCON was singling out sexual orien- 
tation for special attention and wondered whether the policy was providing 
special protection for the topic of sexual orientation and/or special rights for 
sexual minority faculty and/or students. 
Within AFCON it was obvious to everyone that there was no question of 
special protections or special rights. The principles central to the draft policy 
were the principles AFCON had consistently applied throughout its history in 
addressing all sorts of academic freedom issues and controversies. We real- 
ized, however, that our most fundamental principles had for the most part been 
implicit in our analyses and positions rather than explicit objects of systematic 
attention. Outside our organizational context, our proposed policy on sexual 
orientation did indeed seem to be creating special protections and rights for 
certain topics and persons. 
With these considerations in mind we decided that, rather than approve a 
special document concerning sexual orientation, it would be better to step 
back, formulate and approve an explicit version of our general principles of ac- 
ademic freedom, and then return to the topic of sexual orientation as part of a 
more general treatment of sexuality that was itself based directly on AFCON's 
general principles. The result of this process was a set of Principles of Aca- 
demic Freedom adopted by the AFCON Board in September 1999 (see appen- 
dix a) and a longer statement entitled "Sexuality and Academic Freedom," 
based on these principles, that was approved by the AFCON Board in April 
2000 (available at http://www.NebrWesleyan.edu/offices/library/Afcon). 
AFCON's statement on sexuality begins by noting AFCON's concern that "the 
dozens of cases involving human sexuality that AFCON has addressed in recent 
years are just the tip of the iceberg that chills education about sexuality thoughout 
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Nebraska" (p. 1). Far from receiving special protection, the topic of sexuality is 
routinely treated as one requiring especially stringent restrictions on expression: 
Implicit in most efforts to restrict discussion of sexuality is a 
widely-shared assumption that human sexuality is special in ways that 
render standard principles of academic freedom isrelevant. We see no 
justification for this view. In this statement we apply general principles 
of academic freedom to seven overlapping areas of concern with regard 
to sexuality and academic freedom. (p. 1) 
The statement then goes on the address (a) sexuality within the curriculum, 
(b) teaching sexual responsibility, (c) student freedom of belief and expres- 
sion, (d) freedom of inquiry, (e) sexual harassment, (f) equal opportunity, and 
(g) sexual orientation. With regard to the latter it notes that 
[sleveral of the examples used in this policy statement involve sexual o ~ i -  
entation. This reflects the reality that a large proportion of the complaints 
and concerns that come to our attention involve sexual orientation. The 
fact that issues of sexual orientation are controversial in our society does 
not justify censorship. On the contrary, recognizing that the urge to rest~ict 
intellectual freedom is always strongest with regard to controversial mat- 
ters, school authorities should be especially vigilant in protecting intellec- 
tual freedom with regard to matters of sexual orientation. (p. 3) 
In the remainder of this article, I analyze three illustrative cases involving 
matters of sexual orientation. The first, involving the use of an epithet to ex- 
press an offensive point of view, is hypothetical. The second, involving an of- 
fended Christian, is adapted from my own experiences teaching about the 
development of sexual orientation and sexual identity in a course on adoles- 
cent psychology. The third, in which a graduate assistant teaches about alleged 
cures for homosexuality, is an actual case that arose in the counseling psychol- 
ogy program of my department. Beyond whatever specific insights these anal- 
yses may yield, I hope to demonstrate that AFCON's general principles of 
academic freedom provide a useful framework for generating consistent and 
justifiable responses to educational issues and circumstances concerning mat- 
ters of sexual orientation. 
CASE STUDIES 
Case One. In a class discussion of what is encornpassed in the concept of 
fundamental rights, a student argues that fundanzental rights include the right 
not to be discriminated against because of your sexual orientation. Another 
student says this sort of absurd claim shows the problem with vague notions of 
human rights. A third student agrees with the second, noting how vagueness 
leads to overly broad conceptions of rights that protect immoral behavior and 
evil people. A fourth student adds that human rights can't protect everyone 
and everything. The first student replies that human rights, by definition, are 
rights that protect all people. "Yeah, people," murmurs a fifth student, "not 
faggots." You're the teacher. 
It is readily understandable that a teacher in this situation might feel increas- 
ingly disappointed and frustrated by the successive comments of the second, 
third, and fourth students. Even if you recognize the right of these three stu- 
dents to express their views you may be tempted, especially given this context, 
to penalize the fifth student for using the term "faggot" or at least to warn stu- 
dents that they will be punished for using that word. This temptation, I will ar- 
gue, should be resisted, not only out of respect for the rights of your students 
but also because, from an educational point of view, there are better ways to 
handle this situation. 
A central theme of AFCON's Principles is that academic freedom applies 
not only to faculty but to students as well. Your students, no less than you, have 
"a right to believe whatever they believe" (Principle 2) and "a right to express 
their views" (Principle 3). These principles can be justified on both moral and 
educational grounds. Morally, respect for persons entails respect for their in- 
tellectual autonomy, even if you justifiably believe them to be less developed 
and/or less educated than yourself (Kors & Silverglate, 1999). Educationally, 
moreover, there is substantial evidence that learning and development are fos- 
tered by contexts of intellectual freedom (Moshman, 1998, 1999). 
It might be argued that freedom of expression is not absolute and that this is 
one of those cases where common sense demands some limitation. It is indeed 
true that restrictions on the time, place, or manner of expression can sometimes 
be justified, but we should be wary of relying on "common sense" to guide us 
in this regard. Rather, we should be careful that any such restrictions are care- 
fully delineated and justified, and that they are neutral with regard to view- 
point. 
In academic contexts, in particular, freedom of expression may justifiably 
be limited to matters "relevant to the curriculum" (Principle 3). A student who 
persistently talks about "faggots" in a calculus class, for example, might justi- 
fiably be required to stick to the topic of calculus and ultimately penalized for 
failing to do so. A student who persistently interrupts a calculus class to en- 
dorse gay rights, however, should be equally subject to sanction. Viewpoint 
neutrality is key here. Legitimate limitations on classroom speech, moreover, 
should not be abused by applying a stricter standard of relevance to objection- 
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able views. The fifth student in the present case may be expressing a highly ob- 
jectionable view of gays and lesbians, and may be expressing it in a rather 
inarticulate way (a point to which I shall return), but the student is indeed ex- 
pressing a view relevant to the topic under discussion. 
It might be argued that what distinguishes the fifth student from the second, 
third, and fourth is not viewpoint but rather the use of the epithet "faggot." Per- 
haps we cannot punish students for opposing gay rights but can't we punish 
students who use telms so offensive to others in the class that their manner of 
expression, as distinct from their point of view, is an act of harassment? Other- 
wise, some students may be so offended as to be silenced, thus denying them 
an equal opportunity to exercise their own academic freedom (Principle 8). 
There is something to be said for this argument, but there is also great daa- 
ger in it. As we will see in Case Two, it is not only sexual minorities who may 
be offended by their fellow students. The key to addressing this issue in a fair 
and consistent way, I think, is to carefully distinguish offensive speech from 
acts of harassment. Academic freedom protects the expression of all view- 
points, "even if those views are deemed to be false, absurd, offensive, or other- 
wise objectionable" (Principle 3). As noted in the Sexuality statement, however, 
academic freedom does not protect harassment, strictly defined as "a pattern of 
actions specifically directed against a particular individual with the intent of hu- 
miliating, intimidating, or otherwise harming that individual" (p. 2). If a student 
were to repeatedly call someone else in the class a faggot (or a bitch, kike, etc.) 
despite clear indication that the other student found this objectionable, that 
would be a serious offense not protected by norms of academic freedom. Rea- 
sonable people might disagree on exactly where one draws the line between of- 
fensive speech and harassment, but it should be clear that the comment of the 
fifth student in the present case falls far shol-t of that line. 
What, then, should you do in the present case? One important option for a 
teacher in any case involving student discussion is not to say anything at all. 
Peer interaction has a dynamic of its own that can be highly effective in pro- 
moting development and education and that may be undermined by pro- 
nouncements fronl a teacher or other authority (Moshman, 1998, 1999). It is 
possible in the present case that if you hold your tongue for a moment, other 
students, perhaps even including those opposed to gay rights, will criticize the 
use of the term "faggot" and, precisely because they are peers, have more im- 
pact than you could possibly have had. 
There is no guarantee that this will happen, however. It is possible that there 
will be a stunned silence as students wait to see your reaction and that if you do 
not react this will be taken as acquiescence. It is also possible that if you do not 
step in, the discussion will move on to something else and your opportunity to 
use the present situation for educational purposes will be lost. Your own aca- 
demic freedom as the teacher to decide how to proceed is based on the assump- 
tion that you are in the best position to judge what will be most educational for 
your students. 
One excellent option, I suggest, is to ask the fifth student to clarify and jus- 
tify his or her view. More specifically, you might, with seeming innocence, 
ask what is meant by "faggot" and why individuals in this category do not 
qualify as people. This response is, to be sure, a bit disingenuous. You are not 
directly accusing the student of making a snide and ignorant remark that fails 
to advance the discussion but you have no objection if the student or others 
make this inference. The student may be unpleasantly sulprised to be asked to 
justify a comment that was not meant to be taken seriously, at least not in any 
academic sense. If the student has no meaningful response to your query, oth- 
ers in the class may conclude that comments of this sort are unjustifiable and 
some may go on to question the earlier facile rejections of gay rights. They 
may also come to see that intellectual discussions are more than just serial 
statements of diverse opinions. They may see that in your classroom they are 
free to say whatever they wish but that they should be prepared to explain and 
justify whatever they say. 
It is possible, of course, that the student will indeed have some response. 
You can then proceed from there to state your own views about the use of 
terns like "faggot" and/or about the nature and scope of fundamental human 
rights. Respect for a student's right to hold a particular opinion does not entail 
agreement with, or even respect for, that opinion. On the contrary, respect for 
students is fully consistent with the presentation of alternative views and with 
efforts to convince students to change their opinions. The key is that such ef- 
forts must not be, and must not be perceived to be, coercive. It should be clear 
both to you and your students that, in the end, they "have a right to believe 
whatever they believe and to maintain or change their beliefs as they deem ap- 
propriate" (Principle 2). 
Case Two. A class is discussing the psychological impact of discrimination 
on various groups. A student says that the major problem for ga.ys is the psy- 
chological impact of Christian biases and bigotry. Another student says these 
remarks oflend him as a Christian. Other students agree with the first that 
Christians are indeed, for the most part, honzophobic bigots whose hateful 
rhetoric causes ongoing violence against gays and lesbians. The Christian stu- 
dent gets up to leave. What should you do as the teacher? 
Two seemingly contradictory points are key in addressing this issue. First, the 
student has a right to leave. And second, you should try to convince him to stay. 
With regard to the first point, you do have general authority as the teacher to 
set reasonable standards, including standards of class attendance, for passing, 
or receiving high grades in, your course. You have no obligation to devise cri- 
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teria that will enable a student who finds your course offensive to receive an A 
without ever attending class. Students sometimes do have good reasons for 
missing class, however, and all teachers should make provisions for accommo- 
dating at least a few justified absences. In the present case, the student may be 
angry and upset about what he perceives as a personal attack and/or an assault 
on his religious beliefs. He may have learned from past experience that it is im- 
portant for him to get away and cool down when he feels too angry to maintain 
his composure. You do not have to excuse him from whatever work he misses, 
but you should not forbid him to leave. 
Even as you acknowledge his right to leave, however, you can and should 
try to convince him to stay, even if you believe that he is indeed a homophobic 
bigot and that his departure would help the class achieve a consensus consis- 
tent with your own views. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the de- 
parture of any student will obviously limit the education of that student. Your 
obligations to your students are not limited to those students who share your 
beliefs (Principle 8). Second, if your specific intent is to educate students about 
sexual orientation and alleviate homophobia, homophobic students are pre- 
cisely the audience you most need to reach. The departure of an apparently ho- 
mophobic student, and the consequent alienation of other Christian and/or 
homophobic students, thus undermines the achievement of your pedagogical 
goals. Finally, given that the Christian student appears to represent a minority 
view in this class, his departure will decrease the diversity of views in your 
classroom. If other students perceive it as best not to share what they see as a 
disfavored view, moreover, the opportunity for productive discussion is 
greatly compromised. 
What will it take to convince the Christian student to stay? Quite possibly, 
he might like to see you show your support for him personally and/or for civil 
discussion in your classroom by punishing those who have called him a homo- 
phobic bigot. 
On a continuum from offensiveness to harassment, the present circum- 
stances arguably fall a bit closer to harassment than those of Case One. As of- 
fensive as the term "faggot" may be, no particular person was called a faggot in 
Case One, whereas the Christian student in the present case heard Christians 
denounced as homophobic bigots immediately after he identified himself as a 
Christian. He might believe the statements he found so offensive were aimed at 
him in particular with the intent to humiliate and silence him. 
On the present facts, however, you have no reason to doubt that the students 
who said most Christians are homophobic bigots genuinely believe this, and 
you must be clear with all your students that they have a right to hold and ex- 
press this view. Even if students were to say that all Christians are homophobic 
bigots, an assertion that is demonstrably false, you must be clear that students 
have a right to believe this and a right to say what they believe. If some of your 
students follow the Christian student back to his dorm room and continue to 
berate him for his views after he has made it clear that he no longer wishes to 
discuss the issue, they may be guilty of harassment. Wherever the line separat- 
ing offensiveness from harassment may be, however, it clearly is not reached 
in the present case. 
Unless the present case is part of a larger picture of targeted abuse, then, 
there is no question of harassment. Without singling anyone out for punish- 
ment, however, there is much you can do to simultaneously support the of- 
fended student, support the students who have offended him, and turn the 
present situation to educational advantage. For a start, you can assure the 
Christian student as he heads for the door that you understand why he is upset, 
that you intend to seriously address what has just happened in the class, and 
that you believe his presence will enhance the discussion to follow. You 
should be clear that you are not telling him to stay but asking him to stay, and 
that you are requesting this not just because he has a right to be in the class but 
because you believe his potential contributions will enhance the educational 
value of the class. 
How you proceed from this point will depend not only on whether the 
Christian student decides to stay but also on what you know of the class and on 
how your students react to the situation. At the very least, however, you have 
an opportunity to encourage your students to avoid stereotyping, to express 
themselves in a civil manner, and to respect and value ideological diversity. 
You can and should promote these dispositions and values without censorship 
or punishment. In the short run, the most efficient way to ensure civil discus- 
sions in which no one is offended may be to set strict rules students must fol- 
low to avoid penalties. The resulting discussions, however, are likely to be not 
only civil but bland. In the long run, you want students to engage in civil and 
productive discussions out of respect for each other rather than due to fear of 
your power to censor and punish. 
It is quite possible, I should add, that in a case of this sort the offended stu- 
dent might be out the door before you have time to decide what to do and gone 
before you can go after him. You should not berate yourself for failing to de- 
vise Solomonic responses to difficult circumstances in the blink of an eye. 
Even if the offended student is gone, however, the considerations raised above 
can direct you in discussing what just happened with the remaining students in 
the class, letting them know that you hope to restore relations with the of- 
fended student, explaining why, and inviting them to assist you. Following 
through with the offended student may not only be the right thing to do for his 
sake but may also provide the rest of the class with a useful model of maintain- 
ing dialogue and community in the face of deep disagreements. 
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Case Three. A graduate teaching assista17t teaches a class of ps.ycho1ogy 
students that homosexuality is a ps.ychosexua1 disorder than caiz be reversed 
through reparative therapies. As the instructor responsible for the course, you 
think this is false and you know it is contrary to the views of nzostpsychologists 
and psychological orga~zizatiorzs. What should you do? Would it matter if the 
teacher were a colleague, rather than a graduate student under your supervi- 
sion? 
Cases One and Two both involve students' expression of their own ideas. 
Teachers also have a right to express their own ideas, but there is nevertheless 
an important difference between teachers and students. Teachers have a re- 
sponsibility to organize their classes around an academically defensible cussic- 
ulum. Correspondingly, those responsible for hiring, supervising, and/or 
evaluating teachers have the dual responsibility of (a) respecting the academic 
freedom of individual teachers, and (b) protecting the educational interests and 
academic freedom of students. The question of what is taught thus raises issues 
of curriculum that are in some ways more subtle than the question of what an 
individual has a right to say. 
One preliminary consideration in the present case is the nature and scope of 
the course. If this were a course in calculus, it would be immediately obvious 
that sexual orientation and psychotherapy are at best tangential, and likely ir- 
relevant, to what students are there to learn. The right of students and teachers 
to express their views in class is limited to matters "relevant to the cut-1-iculum" 
(Principle 3). Under some circumstances a teacher of calculus inight reason- 
ably deem it relevant to note the sexual orientation of a prominent mathemati- 
cian or to comment on the effectiveness of psychotherapy for math anxiety. 
For a math teacher to devote substantial class time and attention to issues of 
sexual orientation and psychotherapy, however, regardless of what viewpoint 
she or he expresses about these matters, is an abuse of authority. Recognizing 
that students are a captive audience, teachers must not exploit their position by 
systematically subjecting their students to personal opinions on matters out- 
side the scope of the course. 
These considerations of relevance apply to some extent even in a psychol- 
ogy class. Suppose in the present case that the course for which you are the in- 
structor is a large course in introductory psychology and that the graduate 
teaching assistants (GTAs) you supervise are responsible for weekly recitation 
sections intended to assist students in understanding material from the lecture 
and textbook. Students in this case have a legitimate expectation that their reci- 
tation sections will be devoted to the relevant material. GTAs should be free to 
provide examples and applications that go beyond those provided in lectures 
and text but they must not simply replace course topics with others that reflect 
their own idiosyncratic interests and personal agendas. Thus forbidding a GTA 
to devote an entire session to sexual orientation might be legitimate, providing 
the ban applies to all GTAs regardless of what point of view they wish to teach 
about this issue. 
To the extent that the topic of sexual orientation is relevant to the course, 
however, it would infringe on the academic freedom of the GTA to forbid or 
punish the expression of particular views about this. Students and teachers, in- 
cluding GTAs, "have a right to express their views on any matter relevant to 
the curriculum even if those views are deemed to be false, absurd, offensive, or 
otherwise objectionable" (Principle 3) 
That's not the end of the analysis, however. As the instructor responsible for 
the course, you can require that the curriculum include certain content. Thus 
you can present, or require the GTA to present, whatever information or ideas 
about sexual orientation and psychotherapy you believe ought to be included 
in the curriculum. This might include relevant research results, your own inter- 
pretations of these results, relevant theories and expert opinions, and/or poli- 
cies of the American Psychological Association or other organizations. 
Note that this approach, consistent with concern for the right of students not 
to be indoctrinated, instantiates a bias for inclusion, for expanding the curricu- 
lum rather than contracting it (Principle 6). You can see to it that students are 
exposed to whatever infomation or ideas you deem relevant and appropriate, 
but you cannot restrict the expression of alternative views by either the GTA or 
students in the class. 
It should be noted that this bias for inclusion is not a requirement that all in- 
formation and ideas relevant to a topic be included in the curriculum. If you con- 
vince the GTA that certain ideas are wrong and should not be presented, she or 
he is free to delete them, and vice versa (Principle 6, last sentence). It is allnost 
never possible for a curriculum to include all perspectives, hypotheses, argu- 
ments, evidence, and interpretations on a given topic and it would thus be absurd 
to argue that students have a sight to a curriculuin that encompasses everything. 
But a GTA should be permitted to go beyond the curriculum you have devised, 
and students in turn have a right to add additional ideas of their own. 
Suppose now that the teacher in question is not a GTA under your supervision 
but a colleague in your department. Obviously you have no personal authority to 
require your colleague to teach or not teach anything in particulas, nor should your 
Chair, your Dean, another administrator, or the governing board of the institution 
have such authority. To the extent that responsibility for a course goes beyond the 
individual instructor it should be vested in a curriculum committee consisting of 
faculty and other professionals with relevant expertise. In order to protect the right 
of students to a cuniculum devised on academic rather than political, religious, or 
other grounds, "[c]urriculum should be determined by teachers and other profes- 
sionals on the basis of academic considerations" (Principle 5). 
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What if there is disagreement between a curriculum committee and an indi- 
vidual teacher? As in the relation of a supervisory instructor and a GTA, the 
resolution of such disagreement should not consist of vesting ultimate author- 
ity at one level or the other. Rather, the structure of authority should reflect a 
bias toward inclusion rather than exclusion (Principle 6). A curriculum com- 
mittee might, for example, require that a particular course that serves as a pre- 
requisite for others include particular topics, ideas, and information, but must 
permit individual teachers the flexibility to add additional topics, ideas, and in- 
formation relevant to the course. 
It is worth adding that colleagues are free to discuss their courses with each 
other and to recommend and consider n~odifications. Students and others 
should also be free to make suggestions. In general, faculty should be more 
open to "changes that expand the curriculum" than to "changes that contract or 
restrict it" (Principle 6). With regard to voluntary modifications of the curricu- 
lum, however, this bias toward inclusion is not absolute. Faculty should resist 
additions that "cannot be justified academically" and should be open to dele- 
tions if they are convinced that "what is deleted was not academically justifi- 
able" (Principle 6). Open discussions of curriculum in noncoercive contexts 
are themselves an important aspect of academic freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
Restrictions on education about sexual orientation are pervasive throughout 
elementary and secondary education and all too common in higher education 
as well. Given this state of affairs it is understandable that in those circurn- 
stances where sexual minorities, and those sympathetic to sexual minority 
viewpoints, find themselves in power they will be tempted to compensate by 
indoctrinating students in their own views. A better approach, I have sug- 
gested, regardless of who has the power to devise and administer the curricu- 
lum, is to educate students in accord with principles of academic freedom such 
as those proposed by AFCON. 
The proposed principles permit advocacy, rather than requiring neutrality, 
but do not permit indoctrination. That is, instructors may express and justify 
their own ideas relevant to the curriculum and try to convince students to adopt 
those ideas and/or to abandon alternatives, but must not coerce or require be- 
lief, censor or punish students who remain unconvinced, or restrict access to 
alternative views. Adherence to these principles will, I suggest, permit effec- 
tive education about matters of sexual oriesltation that is fully consistent with 
the rights of all involved. 
REFERENCES 
American Association of University Professors (2001). 1940 Statement of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure, with 1970 interpretive comments. In Policy 
doc~~nzents arzd reports (9th ed., pp. 3-10). Washington, DC: AAUP. 
Hazelwood School District v. Kzrhlmeier (1988). 484 U.S. 260 
Kors, A. C., & Silverglate, H. A. (1999). The shadow university: The betrayal of liberty 
on America's campuses. New York: Harperperennial. 
Moshman, D. (1998). Cognitive developn~e~lt beyond childhood. In W. Damon (Series 
Ed.), D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of childpsychology: Vol. 2 .  Cog- 
nition, perception, and language (5th ed.) (pp. 947-978). New York: Wiley. 
Moshman, D. (1999). Adolescerzt psychological developnzent: Rationality, morality, 
and identity. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
O'Neil, R. M. (1997). Free speech in the college conzmurzity. Bloornington: Indiana 
University Press. 
160 Addressing Hoi?~oyhobia nd Hetel-osexisr?~ on College Campuses David Moshnzaiz 161 
APPENDIX 
Principles of Academic Freedom adopted by the Academic Freedom 
Coalition of Nebraska (AFCON) on September 11, 1999 
1. Nature and Purpose ofAcademic Freedom. Academic freedom refers to in- 
tellectual freedom in educational and research contexts, including free- 
doms of belief, expression, discussion, and inquiry. A commitment to 
intellectual freedom respects the rights of students and teachers and 
creates an educational context that promotes learning, development, 
and original research. 
2. Freedon? of Belief. All individuals, including students and teachers, have 
a right to believe whatever they believe and to maintain or change their 
beliefs as they deem appropsiate. Educational institutions may present 
altelnative views but may not require belief in those views. Students may 
be evaluated and graded with regard to their understanding of curricular 
material but not on the basis of their agreement with particular view- 
points. 
3. Freedom of Expression. All individuals have a right to express their 
views privately and publicly and to discuss them with others. In aca- 
demic contexts, students and teachers have a right to express their views 
on any matter relevant to the cul~iculum even if those views are deemed 
to be false, absurd, offensive, or otherwise objectionable. Some sestric- 
tions on expression are justifiable in cases where individuals are speak- 
ing in an official capacity on behalf of the institution. 
4. Freedoin of Inquiry. Educational institutions should encourage individu- 
als to pursue their own interests and ideas and should promote access to 
relevant sources of information. Inquiry should not be suppressed by re- 
stricting access to controversial topics or viewpoints or by hindering the 
formulation of conclusions that may be deemed objectionable. 
5. Formulation of Curriculum. Curriculum should be determined by teach- 
ers and other professionals on the basis of academic considerations. It is a 
responsibility of administrators and school boards to support justifiable 
cu~ricular decisions and to educate their constituencies about the educa- 
tional importance of an inclusive curriculum and the critical role of re- 
spect for academic freedom. 
6. Challenges to the Curriculum. Suggested modifications of the curricu- 
lum should not be accepted merely to resolve a complaint, but neither 
should such suggestions be automatically rejected as illegitimate. In gen- 
eral, changes that expand the curriculum are more likely to be appropri- 
ate than changes that contract or restrict it. On the other hand, additions 
may be illegitimate if what is added cannot be justified academically, and 
deletions may be appropriate if what is deleted was not academically jus- 
tifiable. 
7. Parental Rights. Parents have a right to discuss their views with their 
own children and to communicate with the school if they have sugges- 
tions or concerns about what they perceive the school to be teaching. 
Schools should accept the responsibility of explaining and justifying 
their curricula. In general, parents have the authority to direct their own 
minor children's education, subject to the responsibility of the school to 
provide an adequate education and to respect the rights of the student. 
8. Equal Opportunity. Students and teachers have a right to academic free- 
dom regardless of individual, biological, cultural, religious, theoretical, 
ideological, political or other characteristics, backgrounds, or view- 
points. 
9. Privacy. In seeking information about potential or current employees 
and students, academic institutions should avoid making official inqui- 
ries that target personal expressive activities or that are so broadly or 
vaguely defined as to chill intellectual freedom. With regard to academic 
assignments, students may be encouraged to speak or write about their 
lives, and may choose to do so, but may not be required to reveal per- 
sonal information that they wish to keep private. 
10. Due Process. Academic institutions should ensure that their judicial and 
quasi-judicial procedures provide sufficient due process to protect intel- 
lectual freedom. 
